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RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
BY  B.  DOUGLAS  BERNHEIMI 
This paper examines the nature of rational choice in strategic games. Although there are 
many reasons why an agent might select a Nash equilibrium strategy in a particular game, 
rationality alone  does not require him to do  so. A  natural extension of widely accepted 
axioms  for  rational  choice  under  uncertainty  to  strategic  environments  generates  an 
alternative class of strategies, labelled "rationalizable." It is argued that no rationalizable 
strategy can be discarded on the basis of rationality alone, and that all rationally justifiable 
strategies are members of the rationalizable set. The properties of rationalizable strategies 
are studied, and refinements are considered. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE NOTION  OF EQUILIBRIUM  proposed by Nash [19] has come to play a dominant 
role in economic applications of noncooperative games. While analyses of Nash 
equilibria have  unquestionably contributed to  our understanding of  economic 
behavior, it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that Nash  "solved" 
the  problem  of  noncooperative  strategic  choice.  There  is  a  small  literature 
(beginning with Ellsberg [6]) and a much larger oral tradition which argues that 
Nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality, nor a reasonable 
empirical proposition. 
In this paper I take the view that although there may be various reasons why 
an  agent might select a Nash  strategy, the notion  of  an  equilibrium has little 
intrinsic appeal within a strategic context. When an agent reaches a decision in 
ignorance  of  the  strategies adopted  by  other  players,  rationality  consists  of 
making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs, 
rather than one  which is optimal, post hoc. This point  of view is not  original; 
indeed,  most  serious justifications  of  the  Nash  hypothesis  embrace  such  an 
approach, arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a Nash outcome, and 
consequently  will  choose  their  equilibrium strategies. Nevertheless,  when  we 
think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realiza- 
tions, it becomes clear that the Nash hypothesis, far from being a consequence of 
rationality, arises from certain restrictions on agents' expectations which may or 
may not be plausible, depending upon the game being played. We are then quite 
naturally led to ask: are there any restrictions of individuals' expectations (and 
hence choices) which are required by rationality alone, rather than by (subjec- 
tive) plausibility? This  paper is  concerned  with defining, justifying,  character- 
izing,  and  refining  a  criterion  for  rational  strategic  choice,  which  I  label 
"rationalizability." 
l  I would like to thank Franklin M. Fisher, Eric Maskin, Kevin Roberts, Peter Diamond, Joseph 
Farrell, and  two  anonymous  referees, as  well  as  those  attending presentations of  this paper, for 
helpful comments. Jeanne Dowd,  Alice  Sanderson, and Lucia Alviano provided much appreciated 
technical assistance. This paper is based on Chapter 2 of my dissertation. 
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In the following section, I motivate the concept of rationalizability as a natural 
extension of Savage's [21] axioms of choice under uncertainty. Section 3 develops 
a  rigorous framework for  analyzing  individual  strategic choice,  and  presents 
mathematical  definitions  of  rationalizability,  along  with  existence  theorems. 
Alternative routes to  rationalizability are considered in  Section  4,  where it  is 
shown that several plausible modes of boundedly rational behavior will lead to 
strategic choices which are, in some sense, almost rationalizable. The widespread 
use of  the Nash  equilibrium concept  in economic  analysis makes it critical to 
examine the relationship between Nash equilibrium strategies ("Nash strategies" 
for short) and rationalizable strategies. This is done in Section 5. This analysis 
leads naturally into an investigation of the topological properties of rationalizable 
strategies. Multiplicity  is  found  to  be  a  rather severe problem.  As  this  may, 
understandably, be viewed as a practical limitation, Section 6 undertakes refine- 
ments  of  the criterion. These  refinements are viewed  as  "plausibility" require- 
ments, which we may add to our minimal requirement of rationality. Applica- 
tions to particular economic problems are undertaken in Section 7. 
This work is closely related to that of Pearce [20], who independently devel- 
oped  the  notion  of  rationalizability. Our papers are complementary in  many 
ways. In particular, I focus attention on the properties of rationalizable strategies 
in  general normal form games,  devoting  relatively little  space  to  refinements. 
Pearce emphasizes  the  development  of  refinements, particularly for  extensive 
form games. 
2.  MOTIVATION 
(a)  Problems with an Equilibrium  Approach 
The only natural equilibrium notion for a strategic game is that of Nash:  it is 
the only  state of  the game which, when  properly anticipated, is  self-fulfilling. 
However, this should not be taken to imply that agents will naturally select their 
Nash strategies. The economist's predilection for equilibria frequently arises from 
the  belief  that  some  underlying dynamic  process  (often  suppressed in  formal 
models) moves a system to a point from which it moves no  further. However, 
where there are no equilibrating forces, equilibrium in this sense is not a relevant 
concept.  Since each  strategic choice  is resolved for all time at a specific point 
during the play of a game, the game itself provides no dynamic for equilibration. 
Further, there is no  sensible way to introduce a dynamic while still preserving 
individual rationality. 
Specifically, it is fruitless to argue that repetitions of a game generate conver- 
gence  to equilibrium. Unlike  the stylized dynamics of  competitive equilibrium, 
where the movement of prices forms a structural link between repetitions of an 
economy,  there is nothing structural tying together successive plays of a game. 
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meaningful dynamic. On the other hand, if they are aware of the repetitions, then 
the repeated game is itself a new  game, entirely distinct from its components. 
Convergence of  component  choices  may  then have  nothing  whatsoever to  do 
with attainment of  equilibrium in the game actually played. Attempts to intro- 
duce equilibrating forces simply generate larger composite games, and the nature 
of strategic choices in these larger games remains inherently one-shot. 
Since agents select normal form strategies in ignorance of others' choices, they 
cannot  optimize  subject  to  the  actual  selections  of  their  opponents.  As  no 
sensible  dynamic  can  eradicate this ignorance, we  must justify  any  theory of 
strategic choice  in  terms of  what  it  implies about  the  internal consistency  of 
beliefs held by each player. If we begin to think of rationality in terms of internal 
consistency, it is obvious that players are not ordinarily compelled by deductive 
logic to select their Nash  strategies. As Luce and Raiffa [15, p. 63] point out: 
Even if we were tempted at first to call a (Nash) non-conformist 'irrational', we would 
have to admit that (his opponent) might be 'irrational' in which case it would be 'rational' 
for (him) to be 'irrational'-to  be a (Nash) non-conformist. 
Accordingly, many of the more compelling justifications of Nash  equilibria are 
cast  in  terms  of  how  agents  form  expectations.  Such  arguments attempt  to 
establish that Nash  strategies are salient. 
In  certain  situations,  one  is  immediately  struck  by  the  salience  of  Nash 
selections.  Consider,  for  example,  a  game  in  which  all  participants have  an 
opportunity to  reach a nonbinding  agreement prior to  playing  the game,  and 
assume that they manage  to reach such an agreement.2 Unless  they decide  to 
play Nash  strategies, the agreement will be meaningless, since some players will 
have an incentive to reneg. But once  they agree on a Nash  equilibrium it will 
naturally be  realized during actual  play,  since  every player will  anticipate  it. 
Nevertheless,  other  outcomes  may  be  perfectly  rational.  It  is  possible  that  a 
player  would  make  some  other  choice  because  he  expected  his  opponent  to 
deviate from the agreement, justifying this by the conjecture that his opponent 
expects him to deviate from the agreement, and so forth. Though possible, such 
an occurrence seems, in context, improbable (except, perhaps, for the case of a 
Nash equilibrium in weakly dominated strategies). 
This extreme hypothetical suggests more generally that the salience of  Nash 
equilibrium may provide a landmark around which common  expectations can 
form.  In  the language of  Schelling [22], Nash  equilibrium may  be  "focal." If 
agents share the common belief that Nash equilibrium is normally realized, they 
no longer entertain the rationally admissible doubt that an opponent will fail to 
conform. 
However,  in  many  circumstances the  salience  of  the  Nash  solution  breaks 
2Presumably, the bargaining process is itself governed by some game, hence this line of argumen- 
tation may simply beg the question. For an intriguing discussion of information transmission in this 
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down. By way of analogy, consider Schelling's example of two individuals who 
must  meet  in  New  York  City  without  prior  communication.  Although  all 
selections  are  logically  indistinguishable,  agents  with  similar  cultural  back- 
grounds generally "win" (e.g. natives go to Grand Central Station; tourists go to 
the Empire State Building). However, if agents are chosen from different groups 
(a native plays a tourist), and if each knows the other's predisposition, then there 
is no unique focal alternative, and the outcome is not obvious. 
This analogy makes two important points. First, the salience of any particular 
mode  of  behavior depends  critically upon  whether that salience is universally 
recognized. In the context of strategic choice, suppose the reader was to play a 
game against the author of this paper. Would the reader deviate from his Nash 
selection,  believing  that I would  make  an  unconventional  choice,  or would  I, 
conjecturing  that  the  reader would  play  Nash,  succumb  to  convention?  The 
question  is  one  of  psychology,  not  rationality. Analysis  of  strategic economic 
situations requires us,  implicitly or explicitly,  to  maintain as  plausible certain 
psychological  hypotheses. The hypothesis that real economic  agents universally 
recognize  the  salience  of  Nash  equilibria may  well  be  less  accurate than, for 
example,  the hypothesis  that agents attempt to  "out-smart" or "second-guess" 
each other, believing that their opponents do likewise. 
Second,  the salience of  any particular mode  of  behavior breaks down when 
prescribed actions are not unique. This is often true of Nash equilibria. Consider 
for  example  a  three-person game  with  two  distinct  Nash  equilibria. Even  if 
agents are predisposed to anticipate equilibrium, which one will be anticipated? 
It is entirely plausible that a particular agent will conjecture that one opponent 
anticipates  one  equilibrium, while  his  other  opponent  anticipates  the  second 
equilibrium. The original agent may then select a strategy other than the Nash 
choice  in  either  equilibrium.  Further,  such  an  agent  must  realize  that  his 
opponents may make similar calculations, and so on, leading to a large number 
of justifiable alternatives. 
The  question of  multiplicity has  recently received a  tremendous amount  of 
attention, and numerous refinements of the Nash  concept have been proposed.3 
However,  even  if  some  technique  always  isolated  unique  equilibria, it  would 
represent a psychological hypothesis rather than a characterization of rationality, 
and would be empirically relevant only if it formalized characteristics that are 
already universally perceived as salient. 
(b)  Individual  Rationality and "Rationalizability" 
If Nash equilibrium is a theory of plausible behavior only, it is natural to ask 
whether we can formalize criteria for rational strategic choice. Presumably, this 
would consist of  a broader class of  strategies. Requiring equilibrium would be 
one  way  to  refine  this  set  through  the  imposition  of  (potentially)  plausible 
behavioral restrictions. 
3See, for example, Harsanyi [11], Selten [23, 24], Myerson [18], Kreps and Wilson [13]. RATIONALIZABLE  STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR  1011 
In devising a criterion of strategic choice, I take as my point of departure the 
axioms  of  rational choice  under uncertainty, as formalized by  Savage [21]. In 
particular, an individual is rational in the sense of Savage if he optimizes subject 
to  some  probabilistic assessment of  uncertain events, where this assessment is 
consistent with all of his information. For strategic games in normal form, it is 
natural to proceed on the basis of two premises: (1) agents view their opponents' 
choices  as  uncertain events,  and  (2)  all  agents  abide  by  Savage's axioms  of 
individual  rationality,  and  this  fact  is  common  knowledge  (in  the  sense  of 
Aumann [2]). Rationalizability is the logical consequence of these two premises. 
In  the current paper, I also assume that the payoff  functions of  the game are 
common knowledge. This restriction is inessential.4 
To  understand the implications of  the above  premises, consider the decision 
confronting an agent (A) who must select his normal form strategy in complete 
ignorance of the choice made by a single opponent (B ).5  Since the state of the 
world, as perceived by A, is uncertain, he must construct some assessment of B's 
action and optimize accordingly. Certain strategies are plainly irrational, in that 
they are not best responses to any possible subjective assessment. 
Our second premise requires that A's assessment be consistent with everything 
which he knows about the game. Among  other things, A  knows that B has an 
assessment  of  what A  will  do  for  which  B's  strategy is  a  best  response. A's 
assessment is then inconsistent with his knowledge if it implies that B will, with 
nonzero  probability,  select  a  strategy which  is  not  a  best  response  to  some 
probabilistic assessment of what A  might do. A  must not  only have an assess- 
ment of what B will do subject to which A's choice is a best response, but for 
every forecast of  B's  strategy to which A  ascribes positive probability, A  must 
also be able to construct some conjecture of B's  assessment of A's  action, for 
which  this forecast  of  B's  strategy is  a  best  response.  Since  conformity  with 
Savage's axioms is common  knowledge, this reasoning can be extended indefi- 
nitely. If it is possible to justify the choice of a particular strategy by constructing 
infinite sequences of  self-justifying conjectured assessments in this way,  then I 
call  the strategy "rationalizable." It would be irrational for a player to choose 
any nonrationalizable strategy, as his assessment would contradict (by construc- 
tion) something which he knew about the game. On the other hand, any choice 
satisfying the rationalizability criterion is justifiable  in  an internally consistent 
way. 
I conclude this section with a simple example-the  game illustrated in Figure 
1. This example is chosen to provide a concrete and easily understood illustration 
of the concepts described above; it is not intended to reflect a situation in which 
the Nash  equilibrium is particularly implausible (I have already discussed the 
kinds of game for which that is the case). 
It is possible to show that there is only one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in 
4An earlier version of this paper allowed for alternative information structures, such as incomplete 
information. 
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b,  b2  b3  b4 
a,  0,7  2,5  7,0  0,1 
a2  5,2  3,3  5,2  0,1 
A  a3  7,0  2,5  0,7  0,1 
a4  0,0  0,-2  0,0  10,-1 
NOTE: The  first element  of  each  entry  indicates  the payoff  to A,  while  the 
second  indicates  the payoff  to  B. 
FIGURE  1. 
this game, consisting of both players choosing their second strategies, a2 and b2, 
with certainty. It is clear that these strategies are rationalizable. Can this be said 
for any other choices? In fact, a very simple pattern of degenerate probabilistic 
assessments (i.e., point forecasts) can be used to justify the first and third choices 
of either player. Consider a,.  A will play a,  if he conjectures that B will play b3. 
He could justify this by conjecturing that B conjectures a choice of a3 for A. This 
is internally consistent if A's conjecture of B's conjecture of A's conjecture of B's 
action is b1, which is in turn justified by a higher level conjecture that A will play 
a,.  By finding such a cycle, we establish that all strategies in the cycle (a,, b3,  a3, 
bl) are rationalizable: it is possible to justify any of these strategies by using the 
cycle  to  generate the necessary sequence  of  conjectured forecasts. Such point 
forecasts are unrealistic, and are employed here for expositional purposes only- 
in general, strategies are rationalized by nondegenerate assessments. On the other 
hand, neither a4 nor b4 is rationalizable. Justification of a4 can only be made by a 
conjecture placing nonzero probability on the event that B will play b4. But it is 
possible to show that b4 cannot be justified by any subjective beliefs about A's 
actions.6 
Are  the  first and  third strategies of  these  players  reasonable  choices?  The 
answer depends in part on whether or not one is a "true believer." However, the 
following is suggestive. If A  and B  confine  themselves to  their first and  third 
strategies, they  effectively  play  a  guessing  game  between  four  corners. If  we 
assume that they have  equal probabilities of  outguessing each  other, then the 
expected outcome of playing the game in this way is 3.5 for each player, whereas 
the payoff for Nash  equilibrium is only 3.0 for each. In other words, A  and B 
would, if given the opportunity, prefer to rule out their Nash  strategies. If both 
are aggressive, this may be accomplished by psychological predisposition. 
3.  RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIES 
(a)  Definitions 
A game G in normal form consists of I players (indexed by i), each of whom 
chooses  a  strategy si from  some  strategy set  Si  in  complete  ignorance  of  the 
6Iterative  deletion of dominated strategies could also have eliminated a4 and b4. The similarity is 
not accidental, yet the two procedures are not equivalent. I return to this point in Section 3. RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
selections  made  by  other players.7 The  payoff  to player i  is  given by  the ith 
component  of  the payoff  mapping g(.),  which  maps  strategies into  von  Neu- 
mann-Morgenstern  [26] utility, g:  S -  R',  where S =  X  = Si. Each component 
function will be written as gi(s),  s = (sj)j= ...,.  I will also use s_i  to indicate 
(si).ji.  Since the set of  players, strategy sets, and payoff  functions  completely 
determines the game, G can be equivalently represented by the triplet (I, (S)}, 
g(.)). 
We will need to differentiate between a player's choice, his forecast of another 
player's choice,  his conjecture of  another's forecast of  a third's choice,  and so 
forth. To  keep  track of  which  conjecture is which,  I  introduce the  following 
notation: A' is the set of all sequences (il  . ..,  iN),1  ij  I for 1  j  <  n, where 
1  n <  oo,  il  - i,  and  im,  im,+  for  1  m <  n.  I  will  use  8  to  denote  a 
particular element of this set. That is 8 E A' if 8 is a finite sequence of numbers, 
each of which lies between  1 and I,  the first of which is not  i,  and if no  two 
successive numbers in 8 are identical (the reasons for imposing these restrictions 
will appear below). The following operations may be performed on sequences: 
1(6)  indicates  the  last  element  in  8;  L(8)  indicates  the  length  of  8;  68 +  62 
concatenates 8,  and 82 (e.g., (8,5) + (6,2) = (8,5,6,2)).  Note that A' is not closed 
under +. 
Now we are equipped to describe conjecture. Formally, we proceed as follows. 
Let  Ai be the set of all Borel subsets of Si. 
DEFINITION 3.1:  Any mapping  :  .A  --> J  U J2  U  ·*  *  U  ,  is called a sys- 
tem of beliefs for player i iff V68  A', O(8) C S(^. 
Take 8 = (i,.  ..,  i,).  O(8)  has the following interpretation: s E O(6)  if and 
only if i thinks it is possible that i1 thinks it is possible that  ...  i,_  thinks it is 
possible that i, will choose s. For this conjecture to be sensible 0(8)  must lie in 
i,'s  strategy  space.  Furthermore, it  is  not  meaningful  to  discuss  a  player's 
conjecture of his own conjecture, hence we restrict the domain of e  to sequences 
belonging in A,. 
The case where e(8)  is a singleton has a particularly straightforward  interpre- 
tation:  0(8)  is  i's conjecture of  i,'s  conjecture of  ...  i,_,'s  conjecture of  i,'s 
strategy. If O(8)  has only one element for all 8 in A' (everyone acts as though 
certain), we will say that E is a system of point beliefs. In particular, we will see 
that Nash strategies are justifiable through systems of point beliefs. 
As  discussed in  Section 2,  rationality requires that a player's conjectures be 
consistent with everything he knows about the game. In part, this implies that he 
believes all players optimize subject to subjective assessments; certain conjectures 
are thereby ruled out. Without knowing these assessments, we can nevertheless 
summarize the optimization decision through the use of best response correspon- 
dences.  For  any  s_j  E  S_j,  let  fj(s_)  denote  j's  best  responses  when  his 
7The simultaneity of  choices  assumed here does  not,  of  course, rule out  sequential games;  see 
Section 6(b). 
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opponents choose s_j,  and let Fj  (,U  _,) be j's set of best responses (maximizers of 
expected utility) given thatj  holds subjective beliefs ,U_j  concerning the probabil- 
ity  of  opponents  choosing  particular  strategies  (j1  -j  is  a  Borel  probability 
measure over S_). 
A question arises here as to whether an agent's probabilistic conjectures can 
allow  for  correlation between  the  choices  of  other players. In  a  purely non- 
cooperative framework, such correlation would  be  nonsensical:  the choices  of 
any  two agents are by  definition  independent events;  they cannot  affect  each 
other.8 Consequently, I restrict players to have uncorrelated probabilistic assess- 
ments of their opponents' choices. This requires some notation. Let Mj be the set 
of  Borel probability measures over Sj, and let M -j  be  the set of  Borel proba- 
bility measures over S-i  where any  1i E M-  can  be  decomposed  as  follows: 
j( x  #1A,) =  _lIi7pi(A  ), where Ai is a Borel subset of Si, and 1i E  Mi V  i. 
The requirement of rationality implies that beliefs satisfy a consistency condi- 
tion: 
DEFINITION  3.2:  A system of beliefs E is said to be consistent iff VS E  A' and 
VS,(,) E  e(6), there exists  E  M_l(,),  for which sl(,)  E  Fl(^)(t&l(^)), and 
IA  -1(s)[  X  *Il(8)O[a +  (1)11  =  1. 
That  is,  if  8 = (il,  . ..  , i),  then  anything which  i  thinks it  is  possible  that 
...  i,n-  thinks it is possible that i,n might do, must be a best response to some 
subjective distribution over is's opponents' strategies, where anything receiving 
nonzero probability in this distribution must be  something which i  thinks it is 
possible that  ...  in thinks his opponents might possibly do. 
We are now prepared to define rationalizability: 
DEFINITION  3.3:  si is a rationalizable strategy for player i iff there exists some 
consistent  system  of  beliefs  e  for  player  i  and  some  probability  measure 
u-i E  M_i such that si E Fi(i_i),  and lt1[  X  1#i[(])]]  =  1. 
That is, there is some subjective probability distribution over consistent fore- 
casts which justifies the choice of si. In the particular case where 0  is a system of 
point beliefs, we say that si is a point rationalizable  strategy. 
(b)  Existence and Construction 
We  begin  with  a  bit  of  notation.  Pi(G)  will  indicate  the  set  of  point- 
rationalizable  strategies for  player  i  in  the  game  G,  and  P(G)  will  be  the 
Cartesian product of  those sets. Let  X  =  X  =/'j,  and let the mapping X: 
8Communication between agents may introduce correlation, but such communication should then 
be modelled as part of the game, in which case we are back to a purely noncooperative framework. 
The assumption of no correlation can easily be relaxed if one is concerned with allowing for ad hoc 
forms of prior communication. RATIONALIZABLE  STRATEGIC  BEHAVIOR 
-  cJ  be  defined  by  X(B)  =  X  i=Use  i  Bf  o  7T' i(S)  where  -r_i is  the  projection 
mapping from S to S_,.  X(B) yields the cross product of sets which, for each i, 
consist of all best responses to strategies in r7_i(B). Now  I define two sets which, 
under certain conditions, turn out to be the same as the sets of point rationaliz- 
able strategies. The first is the maximal set B  C S satisfying B = A(B); this will 
be  labelled P'(G).  Under quite general conditions,  this set is well-defined (see 
Proposition 3.1). P'(G)  has the following interpretation: it is the largest set B for 
which (1) if i thinks each of his opponentsj  will choose a strategy in  rj(B), then i 
will play in Ti(B), and (2) any choice in  Ti(B)  is a best response to some selection 
of  strategies from  j.(B) for j  i. These two properties are satisfied by the set 
consisting of any Nash equilibrium (as long as best responses are single valued at 
the equilibrium), but that set is not, in general, maximal. 
The  second  set  with  which  we  shall  be  concerned  is  defined  as  follows: 
P"(G)=  nk=OXk(S).  Here,  Xk(-)  is  defined  recursively  as  X o Xk-l(.).  It  is 
simple to show that Xk(S) forms a nested sequence of sets. Thus, P"(G)  can be 
constructed as follows. Beginning with S, for each player i delete any strategies 
which are not best responses to at least one combination of opponents' choices in 
S_i;  the resulting set is X(S). Next,  for every player i, delete any strategies in 
7Ti  o° (S)  which are not best responses to at least one combination of opponents' 
choices in  r_-i  o X(S). Infinite repetition of this process generates the set P"(G). 
Existence  of  point-rationalizable  strategies  for  finite  and  infinite  strategy 
spaces, along with the equivalence results mentioned above, is established in our 
first result: 
PROPOSITION  3.1: Assume Si C R" is  compact Vi,  and g  is  continuous. Then 
P(G)  =  P'(G)  =  P"(G)  0.  (Proof in Appendix.) 
Rationalizability receives similar treatment. Let Ri(G) be the set of rationaliz- 
able strategies for player i in the game G, and let R(G)  be the Cartesian product 
of  these sets. We begin by noting that if a strategy is point rationalizable, it is 
rationalizable; simply take all subjective probability distributions to be degener- 
ate.  Existence  of  rationalizable  strategies is  then  an  immediate  corollary  of 
Proposition 3.1. 
To  obtain  equivalences similar to  those in Proposition 3.1, we proceed in a 
manner analogous to that adopted for point rationalizability. Let the mapping 
A:J  ->  be  defined  by  A(B)=  =  X  sil si  Fi(  _i)  for  some  -i  E M- 
with  supp  _-i  cC  7r_(B)}.  Define  R'(G)  as  the maximal  set B C S  satisfying 
B = A(B),  and let R"(G)  =  nok0Ak(S).  These sets are analogous to P'(G)  and 
P"(G),  respectively. We obtain the following counterpart of Proposition 3.1: 
PROPOSITION  3.2: Assume Si C Rn is  compact Vi,  and g  is  continuous. Then 
R(G)  =  R'(G)=  R"(G)  =  0.  (The proof mimics that of Proposition 3.1, and is 
therefore  omitted.) 
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The  procedure  used  to  construct  R "(G)  (and  hence,  R(G))  is  similar  to 
iterative  deletion  of  strongly  dominated  strategies; however,  there  are  three 
important differences. (1) A  retains strategies which are Bayes  decisions for a 
particular class of  subjective beliefs (correlations between opponents' strategies 
have been ruled out). For I = 2, no beliefs are ruled out, and this procedure is 
equivalent to deletion of strongly dominated strategies.9  For I  > 2, A produces a 
smaller set. (2) A encounters no ambiguity about which player's strategies should 
be  deleted first, since they are in effect  deleted simultaneously.10 (3) Since the 
rationalizability criterion was generated from primitive concepts, the resulting set 
itself has an important interpretation, and is not simply a technique for refining 
equilibria. 
(c)  Pure vs. Mixed Strategies 
Thus far, I have not  specified whether Si contains pure or mixed strategies. 
This ambiguity was intentional, since the preceding analysis applies equally well 
in either case. In this section, I discuss the relationships between rationalizable 
pure and mixed strategies. 
Notationally,  the  objects  defined  in  the  two  previous  subsections  will  be 
indexed with an "m" or a "p" to denote  that they correspond to the cases of 
mixed  or pure strategy sets respectively. Assume  that each  agent has  a  finite 
number (ki) of strategies. Then Sm is the ki-dimensional simplex, and the vertices 
of this simplex form SP. Applying mappings Am and Am repeatedly to Sm yields 
the point rationalizable and rationalizable mixed strategy sets Pim(G) and R.'(G) 
respectively, and  so  forth. We  now  examine the relationships between PP(G), 
RP(G), Pim(G), and R,m(G). 
It is clear from definitions that PP(G) S  RP(G)  and Pim(G) 5  R1m(G)  (point 
rationalizable strategies are rationalizable). Further, PP(G) 5  P,`'(G), and RP(G) 
5  R,m(G) (if something is (point) rationalizable in pure strategies, it is (point) 
rationalizable in  mixed  strategies). The  reader should  be  careful to  note  that 
RP(G)#  P/m(G) (rationalizability in  pure  strategies is  not  the  same  as  point 
rationalizability in mixed strategies)." 
A perhaps surprising result is that, in a certain sense, allowing for use of mixed 
strategies does  not  expand  the  set  of  rationalizable outcomes  for  a  game.  In 
particular, any  pure strategy which  is  a  component  of  a  rationalizable mixed 
strategy is also rationalizable as a pure strategy. Formally, for any set B let C(B) 
denote the convex hull of B. 
9See Ferguson [9] for a discussion of the relation between Bayes decisions and dominance. 
l'With  more than two players, the order in which dominated  strategies are deleted affects  the 
resulting set of strategies. 
"At  the first level of conjectures, these things look the same; it doesn't matter whether agent i 
responds to a mixed strategy or a prior assessment, as long as the subjective distribution he faces is 
the same. However, for point rationalizability in mixed strategies, all the elements of this conjecture 
must be best responses to the same higher order mixed strategy conjecture, while with rationalizabil- 
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PROPOSITION 3.3:  If for  some game  G, SP is finite,  then Vi  Rf(G)  C Rim(G) 
C C(Rf(G)).  (Proof in Appendix.) 
Intuitively, allowing for probabilistic assessments convexifies the set of oppo- 
nents' alternatives; allowing for mixed strategies cannot create new possibilities. 
To  construct Rm(G)  from  Rf(G),  we  find  each  point  in  Xj1iC(Rf(G))  for 
which i's expected payoff has multiple maxima, and include all mixed strategies 
which place positive probability on only those maximizing choices. 
4.  ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO RATIONALIZABILITY 
Practically speaking, we might not expect agents to check the consistency of 
their beliefs for more than a finite number of levels. This leads us to ask whether 
the  theory of  strategic behavior developed  above  is robust to  deviations from 
perfect rationality. In particular, we say that a strategy is k (point) rationalizable 
if the first k levels of conjectures used to justify  it are consistent (in Definition 
3.2,  we  require consistency  only  for  8  with  L(8)  <  k).  The  following  result 
establishes  that  if  k  is  sufficiently high,  k  (point)  rationalizable strategies are 
almost (point) rationalizable. 
PROPOSITION 4.1:  Assume Si C Rn is compact Vi, and g  is continuous.  Ve > 0 
there exists K such that if k >  K and si is k (point) rationalizable,  then there exists 
a (point) rationalizable  strategy s* where d(si,s*)  <  E. (Proof in Appendix.) 
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that, in practice, k will be sufficiently high for 
us  to  rely  on  this  asymptotic  result. We  therefore consider  another  type  of 
bounded  rationality. As  I  have  argued, it is nonsensical  to  speak of  dynamic 
convergence  to  equilibrium when  agents  are rational. However,  by  bounding 
rationality, dynamics are easily generated. In particular, I examine the Cournot 
dynamic, where the evolution  of  strategies is described by s(t  +  1) C f(s(t))  = 
(fi(s-  I(t)), . . . , f(s-(t))).  Since thef  are correspondences,  f(s)  may not have a 
unique value. Nevertheless, for any initial so repeated application of f(.),  along 
with  some  rule to  resolve ambiguities, generates a  sequence  of  strategies. We 
employ  a  very  strong  notion  of  stability,  which  requires convergence  of  all 
possible sequences evolving from every initial point. 
DEFINITION  4.1:  Let  h:X-  X  be  some  correspondence  from  an  arbitrary 
space X into itself, and suppose d(.,  *) is some distance metric on X. We say that 
Y C X  is globally set stable under the process h(.)  iff given any initial x0 E X 
and  any  sequence  {xk}  formed by  taking xk+l  C h(xk), VE  > 0  there exists K 
such that Vxk with k >  K, there is some x* E  Y for which d(xk, x*) <  E. 
The following result is a corollary of  Proposition 4.1  (under the generalized 
Cournot process, after k periods agents select k-rationalizable strategies). 
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PROPOSITION  4.2:  Assume Si C Rn is compact Vi and g  is continuous.  P(G)  is 
globally set stable under the process f(*). 
In other words, if sequential play is described by a Cournot process, players' 
choice  will  become  almost  point-rationalizable over  time.  In  fact,  if  strategy 
spaces  are  finite,  the  sequence  of  plays  must  actually  consist  of  point- 
rationalizable strategies past a certain number of iterations. The stability result is 
quite strong, and cannot be obtained for Nash equilibria. It is worth mentioning 
that  this  dynamic  can  be  generalized  in  a  number  of  ways  to  enhance  its 
plausibility without doing violence to Proposition 4.2; consequently, our theory 
of strategic behavior is robust with respect to an interesting range of alternative 
behavioral assumptions. 
5.  RELATION TO NASH  STRATEGIES AND  TOPOLOGICAL PROPERTIES 
If for a particular game Nash  strategies are the only rationalizable strategies, 
then  there are very  compelling  reasons why  agents  would  choose  them.  It  is 
therefore important to establish conditions under which this equivalence holds. 
Let N*(G)  indicate  the set of  Nash  equilibria for the game  G, represented as 
points in S.12 Recalling that  i is the projection mapping into the ith component 
subspace Si, define Ni(G) = 7Ti(N*(G)),  where Ni(G) is the set of Nash strategies 
for  player i.  The  Cartesian product of  these  sets will  be  denoted  N(G).  The 
reader should be careful to distinguish this from N*(G),  since N*(G)  C  N(G). 
It  is  trivial to  verify  that  pure (mixed)  strategy Nash  equilibria are point- 
rationalizable in pure (mixed) strategies. Along with Proposition 3.3, this implies 
that the pure strategy components of mixed strategy Nash equilibria are rational- 
izable  in  pure strategies; evidently,  one  need  not  believe  that players employ 
mixed strategies to accept the plausibility of mixed strategy equilibria. 
A more interesting and difficult problem is to determine when Nash strategies 
are the only rationalizable choices. Here we shall undertake the somewhat easier 
task  of  finding  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  Ni(G) =  Pi(G).  Two 
necessary conditions are easily obtained: 
PROPOSITION  5.1: Assume P(G)  = N(G).  Then (a) N(G)  = X(N(G)), and (b) if 
Si C  R  n Vi and g is continuous,  then N(G)  is globally set stable under  fJ ). 
Since N(G)  C  X(N(G)),  failure of the condition in part (a) implies that some 
player has a best response to a vector of Nash strategies for his opponents which 
is  not  itself  a  Nash  selection.  The  proof  is  simple:  anything  which  is  a  best 
response  to  point  rationalizable  strategies is  point  rationalizable,  and  Nash 
strategies are  point  rationalizable.  Intuition  suggests  that  if  I  > 2  and  Nash 
equilibrium is not unique, then ordinarily condition (a) will fail, since forecasting 
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opponents'  choices  from  two  separate equilibria will  typically  lead  to  a  best 
response  that  is  not  Nash.  Part  (b)  follows  directly  from  Proposition  4.2. 
Regardless of whether or not one believes that the generalized Cournot process 
reflects plausible behavior, stability under this process is essential for establishing 
that Nash behavior is the unique consequence of rationality. 
It is possible to extend these conditions by restricting attention to an important 
subclass of games, those for which existence of Nash  equilibria can be guaran- 
teed. In practice, it is convenient to consider a somewhat smaller space of games 
than is actually necessary for this purpose. For any I  (number of  agents) and 
{  Si}  where Vi  Si  is  a  compact,  convex,  nonempty,  nondegenerate  Euclidean 
subset, let r(i, {  Si}) denote the set of I person games played on strategy sets {  Si} 
for which the best response correspondence of every player is a C  1 mapping. 
In order to make statements concerning genericity of results, we must endow 
these spaces with appropriate topologies. Since we are currently concerned with 
point  rationalizability, and  since  games with identical best  response mappings 
have  identical  point  rationalizable sets,  we  can  take  as  equivalent  all  games 
giving rise to  the  same  best  response mappings. It  is then natural to  select a 
notion of distance based upon these mappings. Thus, I endow the set  m(1,  {  Si1}) 
(which is now simply a set of  C  1 best response mappings) with the topology of 
uniform C1 convergence. In this topology, two games are "close" if agents' best 
responses are close for all possible conjectures, and if agents respond similarly to 
local changes in conjectures. 
The following result concerning the topological properties of point rationaliz- 
able  sets  is  important  in  its  own  right,  as  well  as  being  instrumental  for 
determining the relationship between N(G)  and P(G). 
PROPOSITION  5.2:  For any G E r(I, { si  }) if either (a) for some s E  N*(G), some 
eigenvalue of Dfs lies outside the unit circle, (b) N(G)  is not globally set stable, or 
(c) Nash equilibrium  is not unique, then P(G)  contains a continuum of strategies 
(proof in Appendix). 
Unless Nash  equilibrium is unique, globally stable, and satisfies a strict form 
of local stability, there will be continua of point rationalizable strategies. Since 
these requirements are extremely demanding, we would ordinarily expect multi- 
plicity to be a severe problem. 
To  establish  generically necessary conditions  for  N(G)  =  P(G),  we  need  a 
simple  result  which  can  be  proven  through  standard  topological  arguments 
(omitted): on an open dense set of games in r(i, {  Si}), there are a finite number 
of Nash equilibria.'3 Combining this with Proposition 5.2, we have: 
PROPOSITION  5.3:  On an  open dense set  of games  in  r(A, {Si}),  if  P(G)= 
13  Methodological  references include  Guileman  and  Pollack  [10], Hirsh  [12], and  Milnor  [16]; 
familiar applications to Walrasian economics include Debreu [4] and Dierker [5]. 1020  B. DOUGLAS  BERNHEIM 
N(G),  then the Nash equilibrium  s is unique, globally stable, and no eigenvalue of 
Dfs lies outside the unit circle. 
Generically, uniqueness, global stability, and a strict form of local stability are 
necessary conditions for Nash strategies to be the only rationalizable alternatives. 
Note  that if N(G)  C P(G)  on an open dense set of games, then this proposition 
would be vacuous. However, as shown later in this section, this is not the case. 
Are  these  necessary  conditions  for  N(G)  =  P(G)  sufficient  as  well?  It  is 
possible to obtain a result for the case of I = 2 if we strengthen slightly the local 
stability requirement. 
DEFINITION  5.1:  We will say that the Nash  equilibrium s E N*(G)  is strictly 
locally stable iff best response correspondences are single valued at s, and there 
exists c > 0 such that Vso E B(s, E) (the ball around s  of  radius e),  (a) for any 
sequence  Sk  formed by taking  Sk E  f(Sk-  1), limkooSk  =  s, and (b) d(s, f(so)) < 
d(s, so). 
PROPOSITION  5.4:  For I = 2,  the following are sufficient conditions for  P(G) 
-  N(G):  (a) Si C Rn compact, convex, nonempty;  g continuous;  Nash equilibrium 
unique,  globally stable, strictly locally stable. (b) Si finite; N(G)  globally set stable 
and X(N(G)) = N(G)  (proof in Appendix). 
Although the properties listed above are not sufficient for the case of I  > 2 (a 
counterexample  is  available  from  the  author  upon  request), it  is  possible  to 
obtain a simple, easily verifiable condition which immediately implies finiteness 
of rationalizable strategies, as well as P(G)  = N(G).  Specifically, we have: 
PROPOSITION  5.5:  If  Vs,s'  E S,  d(f(s),  f(s'))  <  d(s,s')/(I  -  1)1/2,  then 
rationalizable  strategies are unique, and P(G)  =  N(G)  (proof in Appendix). 
For the case of I = 2, we need only verify that f(  ) is a contraction mapping. 
For I  > 2, the contraction must be sufficiently "fast." 
We  close  this section  with some  final  comments  concerning the topological 
structure of P(G)  and the relationship between N(G)  and P(G).  In P(I, {Si}), 
there are open  sets of games which have multiple equilibria. Consequently, by 
Propositions  5.2  and  5.3,  there  are  open  sets  of  games  for  which  there  are 
continua of  rationalizable strategies, an insignificant subset of which are Nash 
strategies. If these sets were dense P(I, {Si})  as well, then Proposition 5.3 would 
be vacuous. However, an immediate corollary of Proposition 5.5 is that there are 
open sets of games for which P(G)  =  N(G)  and P(G)  is finite (the contraction 
condition is robust to sufficiently small perturbations in the game). 
In spite of these final comments, the preceding analysis has shown multiplicity 
of  rationalizable  strategies  (in  particular, lack  of  finiteness)  to  be  a  severe 
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investigate various plausible psychological hypotheses which serve to refine this 
criterion. This is the topic of the next section. 
6.  REFINEMENTS 
(a)  Games in Normal Form 
Some  modifications  of  rationalizability  are  useful  for  eliminating  certain 
undesirable strategies. In particular, it is somewhat troubling that weakly domi- 
nated  strategies may  be  rationalizable. Mark Machina  has  suggested a  game 
called "guess the lowest positive integer" which drives this point home forcefully. 
It is played by two agents, each of whom names a positive integer. If an agent 
names a lower number than his opponent, he receives a payoff of  1; if he names 
a higher number, he receives  -  1, and if agents' choices are identical, they both 
receive 0 (the game is zero-sum). The only choice which makes any sense is  1. 
However, any positive integer k is point rationalizable. 
Before suggesting a refinement designed to eliminate such anomalies, I must 
underscore two points. First, the general criticism embodied in this example is 
applicable to Nash  equilibria as well, since the Nash  criterion does not require 
players to make nondominated choices in equilibrium. Second, there is nothing 
strictly irrational about  choosing  weakly  dominated  strategies. If  a  player  is 
literally certain that his opponents will not make particular choices, such strate- 
gies may be perfectly sensible. Weakly dominated choices strike us as untenable 
not because they imply internal inconsistency, but because such certainty seems 
implausible. 
A  modification  of  the  "trembling hand  perfectness"  notion  developed  by 
Selten [24] and  adapted  to  normal form games by  Myerson [18] allows us  to 
formally incorporate this lack of complete certainty into conjectures. Specifically, 
assume  that  each  agent  i  has  a  finite  number (ki)  of  pure strategies, and  let 
Sim be  his  mixed  strategy  space  (the  ki-dimensional  simplex).  For  all  i = 
(  .i.l,  .  ,  i,k)  > 0, let S1m(E)  be the restriction of Sim  to mixed strategies which 
give the jth  pure strategy for player i a probability weight not less than Eij.  For 
E =  (e,,  ...  .,  E) define an E-rationalizable  strategy to be a member of the set of 
rationalizable strategies where each player i is restricted to choose an element of 
Sim(Es),  and where these restrictions are common  knowledge. Any  strategy si is 
said to be perfectly rationalizable for player i if it is the limit of E-rationalizable 
strategies as all Eij  go to zero.14 
Selten  and  Myerson  motivate  this  type  of  refinement by  viewing  complete 
rationality  as  a  limiting  case  of  incomplete  rationality.  For  this  notion  of 
14In the "lowest positive integer" game, a slight modification of  this refinement is needed, since 
strategy spaces  are  infinite.  Let  E  be  an  infinite  dimensional  vector  with  Ek >  0  for  all  k,  and 
' 
1Ek <  1. Define  S1m(E)  to be the set of mixed strategies which place a probability weight of at 
least  Ek on  the kth  strategy. Here,  "E goes  to  zero" must  entail  Ek  ---0,  rather than  simply 
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perfectness to be  sensible, it is essential that we  think of  agents as capable of 
making  mistakes  with  infinitessimal probability.  In  related work,  Pearce  [20] 
suggests that by restricting trembles to strategies which are rationally justifiable 
(perhaps the rationalizable set), we might dispense with this incomplete rational- 
ity  motivation  altogether. This  leads  him  to  a  refinement  labelled  "cautious 
rationalizability." The  reader  is  referred to  his  paper  for  a  more  complete 
discussion of these issues. 
(b)  Games in Extensive Form 
As with Nash  equilibria, games in extensive form provide particularly fertile 
ground for refinements of rationalizability. In fact, most Nash modifications for 
such  games  can  be  applied  directly  to  the  rationalizability criterion without 
requiring equilibrium. 
In  particular, it  is  quite  natural to  apply  Selten's [23] subgame perfectness 
criterion directly to  rationalizability. (I  will focus  here on  point  forecasts, but 
the  extension  to  probabilistic  forecasts  is  immediate.)  This  is  accomplished 
through slight modifications of Definitions  3.2 and 3.3. We refer to a system of 
point  beliefs  as  subgame consistent iff  VS E/ A',  (iS)  is  a  best  response  to 
XJ7l1(6)  (S(  +  (j))  in  every  proper  subgame.  A  strategy si  is  then  subgame 
rationalizable if there is a subgame consistent system of point beliefs such that si 
is a best response to  Xj1,_,(i((j)) in every proper subgame. 
Now suppose we have an I-player game of perfect information (play is entirely 
sequential) where no  player is indifferent between  any  terminal nodes  (with a 
finite number of terminal nodes, players will generically have strict rankings). We 
know by backward induction that there will be one subgame perfect equilibrium. 
What  strategies will be  subgame rationalizable? Again,  backward induction  is 
appropriate.  5 This establishes: 
PROPOSITION 6.1: Assume that for  a game of perfect information,  no player is 
indifferent  between any terminal nodes. Then subgame rationalizable strategies are 
unique, and form the subgame  perfect Nash equilibrium. 
A formal proof is omitted. Though conceptually simple, the thrust of this result 
is  rather remarkable: equilibrium is,  generically,  a  consequence  of  subgame 
rationalizability (rationality plus a weak plausibility condition) for a large set of 
games. 
As with subgame perfectness, it is possible to apply other refinements of Nash 
equilibrium, such  as  sequentiality (Kreps and Wilson  [13]) or trembling hand 
perfectness (Selten [23]), directly to  rationalizability. Rather than pursue these 
15Consider any  subgame  consisting  of  a  player j  choosing  between  two  terminal nodes.  His 
decision is unambiguous. Thus, for all 8 with 1(8) = j,  3(8) must involve j  making his best choice at 
this last node. All players know what j's  choice will be at this node, they know that others know it, 
etc.  Effectively,  the  tree has  been  shortened. We  then  repeat the procedure. Since  there is  never 
indifference, e(.)  is uniquely determined by the recursion. RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR  1023 
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possibilities here, I argue that the framework of  rationalizability suggests addi- 
tional refinements. In  order to  conserve space, I opt for an informal develop- 
ment. 
This discussion will concern the game illustrated in Figure 2, taken from Kreps 
and Wilson [13]. There are two (perfect, sequential) Nash  equilibria, (1,R)  and 
(m,L).  It is frequently argued that only the second of these is reasonable: r is a 
weakly dominated strategy for player A, the deletion of which makes R a weakly 
dominated  strategy  for  player  B.  However,  the  well  known  problems  with 
iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies render this "solution" unsatis- 
factory.'6 
As is easily verified, the subgame rationalizable strategies for A and B in this 
game are, respectively, (1, m) and (L, R).  Our first pass at a solution is just the 
Cartesian product  of  these  sets.  However,  the  framework of  rationalizability 
immediately suggests a further refinement. Since we have not required players to 
select equilibrium strategies (this implies that beliefs are homogeneous), informa- 
tion about beliefs may be transmitted  through  actions taken during the evolution  of 
an extensive form game. At  every information set, each player knows that only 
certain justifiable (subgame rationalizable) choices for his opponents could have 
led  to  this  set.  By  observing  play,  he  can  narrow down  the  set  of  possible 
conjectures made  by  these  opponents.  Specifically,  contingent  upon  reaching 
information set I,B  deduces that A  must believe that B  will play L with high 
probability. B knows that A must have chosen m, since this is the only justifiable 
(subgame rationalizable) strategy for A  consistent with  reaching I.  Therefore, 
given that I  is reached, B  will never play R;  we may exclude from B's  set of 
reasonable strategies any subgame rationalizable choice for which B chooses at 
information set I  (for this simple game, R is eliminated). Since A  may deduce 
this as well, he would never select  1, knowing that B  would have chosen L  at 
information node I. Thus, (m,L)  is the only acceptable outcome for this game. 
It is possible  to  formalize the notion  that the evolution  of  a game  conveys 
16For  example, the solution will depend on  the order in which strategies are deleted. It is also 
possible  that strategies deleted  in  one  round would  not  have  been  deleted  in  a  later round. The 
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information about actions and beliefs, and to extend it to more general settings, 
but space does not permit a full treatment here. The interested reader is referred 
to the work of Pearce [20] for a formal development. The preceding example is 
intended to illustrate the potential value of rationalizability in refining theories of 
strategic behavior in extensive form games. I reiterate that the approach used for 
ruling out the undesirable equilibrium in this example is fundamentally incom- 
patible  with  an  equilibrium orientation,  since  such  an  orientation  necessarily 
homogenizes beliefs.17 
7.  APPLICATIONS 
(a)  Oligopoly Theory 
Consider an industry consisting of N firms, each with marginal cost C and no 
fixed costs. The inverse demand will be given by 
p  f K-Q  if  Q<K, 
0  if  Q>  K, 
where Q is quantity, p  is price, and K is some constant. The game is played as 
follows; each firm produces a quantity q E [0, q] (where q exceeds the monopoly 
output) before knowing the choice of any other firm. Anything produced is sold, 
so  total  production  determines  price.  The  goal  of  any  individual  firm  is  to 
maximize profits. 
What  strategies are  rationalizable  in  this  game?  Fortunately,  the  stability 
properties of  this model  are well known  (see Theocharis [25]), so  it is easy  to 
provide an answer to this question. When N = 2, Nash equilibrium can be shown 
to be unique, globally stable, and strictly locally stable. Thus, by Proposition 5.4, 
the Nash  strategies are the only rationalizable alternatives. However, for N  >  3, 
the unique equilibrium is known to be unstable. Proposition 5.2 then implies that 
continua of rationalizable strategies will exist. 
Precisely how  large are these rationalizable sets? Proposition 3.1  provides a 
way of constructing them: we iteratively apply the mapping A to S. Take the case 
of  N > 3. Since q > (K -  C)/2  =  qm (the monopoly  output), f,(  X  ,0,  l)  = 
17In a larger sense, this is true even for games of incomplete information: all players concur on the 
beliefs and actions of a player of a certain type. 
It is possible that one might be able to capture the effects described here in a Bayesian equilibrium 
setting,  where players'  "types" correspond  to  their psychological  predispositions  to  play  certain 
strategies. Such an approach quickly encounters conceptual difficulties, as our refinement implies that 
the probability of encountering an opponent of a particular type (predisposed towards playing "t") is 
zero. Assigning any other probability would occasionally lead to the solution (1, m), which we wish to 
rule out. However, this zero probability restriction must be imposed on the Bayesian solution, and is 
not generated through a natural refinement. 
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[0, q],  so A(S) =  X  l[0, q].  Apply A(.) once more: 
fn(X  [O,  m])  =[O,qm]. 
Convergence is obtained. For N > 3, any output between 0 and the monopoly 
output is rationalizable. Extreme outputs are, of course, rationalized by extreme 
(perhaps improbable) conjectures. 
(b)  Macroeconomic  Rational Expectations 
One popular view of Muthian [17] rational expectations maintains that if every 
agent knows the true model of the economy, then each will be able to deduce (up 
to a stochastic term) the actual state which the economy  attains in any period. 
Rational  expectations  equilibrium  (REE)  is,  in  this  view,  a  consequence  of 
individual  rationality. In  light  of  Evans' [7] observation that an  REE  can  be 
represented as  the  Nash  equilibrium of  an  appropriately formulated game,  it 
should  not  be  surprising that  the  framework developed  in  this paper permits 
rigorous analysis of  such issues. In particular, for any  agent, the expectations 
held by  other agents are unknowns, about which he must form conjectures in 
order to forecast the behavior of markets. If we relax the equilibrium requirement 
that all agents conjecture correctly, instead demanding only that expectations are 
logically consistent with agents' knowledge, we are led to consider the class of 
"rationalizable expectations." These issues are examined in a companion piece 
(Bernheim [3]). 
Stanford University 
Manuscript  received  November,  1982; revision  received  July, 1983. 
APPENDIX 
Note:  Throughout much of this Appendix I suppress G in the notation, e.g., writing P instead of 
P(G).  In  many  places,  the  analysis  focuses  on  a  single  game;  hence  carrying  G  through  is 
cumbersome. 
PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION  3.1: 
Step  1: P" #  0.  Let B  be  some compact  subset of  S.  As  is easy  to verify, the continuity of g 
guarantees that X(B) is nonempty and compact. Note also that if X(B) C B, then X2(B) C X(B). Since 
S  is  nonempty,  compact,  and  X(S) C S,  then  by  induction  Xk(S)  is  nonempty,  compact,  and 
X  k+ l(s)  CX k(S). P" 7  0  follows from the fact that the infinite intersection of compact nested sets is 
nonempty. 
Step  2:  P" =X(P").  Since  Vk  Xk(S)=  X  f=1i o  Xk(S),  P"=  X  fl7i(P").  Thus  it  suffices 
to  show  that fi o 7_ i(P") =  7i(P")  Vi.  (a)  Suppose  si,  E  o 7r_,(P").  There  exists  s E P"  such 
that Si Efi  o 7  ri(s).  s E  P"  implies  s EXk(S)  Vk > 0.  Consequently,  si Ef  o  ,  _i(Xk(S))=  7T  o 
Xk+ (S)  Vk. But then s, E  ri(P"). (b) Suppose s,  v,(P").  Let B = fi-  (s)  (the pre-image of si in 
S_i)-si  E 7Ti(P")  implies si E  fi o 7T_,(Xk(S)),  so B must be nonempty. Standard arguments estab- 
lish  that B  is  closed.  Consider the  sequence  of  compact,  nested  sets  B fn -_i  0 Xk(S).  Since  the 
infinite intersection of these sets is nonempty, B n  T- i(P")  7  0.  So, si Ef  o 7r  i(pa"). 
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Step 3:  P' =  P".  First note that for any two sets B, B' C S, X(B) U X(B') g X(B U B') (this is easy 
to check). Now  suppose that F" =f P'.  Then, there must be A c- S for which X(A) =  A, and some k 
such that A n Xk(S)=  A, but A nlXk+ i(S)C  A. Write Xk(S)=  A U,Xk(S). Then X(A)U,Xo Xk(S) 
c  X(A U Ak(S))  by  the above  result, or A U Xk+ I(S) C X'  'I(5). Intersecting both  sides  with A, 
A C A n  Xk+ '(S)-a  contradiction. 
Step  4:  P =  P'.  (a)  Suppose,  Si e  -T,(P'). By  definition, f  -'(si)n  f  -  1i(P')  #R1  0.  v  E A" with 
L(S)  =  i,  choose  8(S)  e 7r,()[f,  '(si)n  fl ',,(P')].  We must then have 8(e)  E  soi()(P'),  so we can 
repeat this procedure recursively to form the entire mapping 0(.).  Thus si E Pi. 
(b)  Suppose there exists some s, E Pi,  but si (4 zj(P').  There exists a mapping  8  satisfying the 
requirements of Definition 3.1 for s . Let 
Tj=  U  o(S) 
7)  =  Ue  8 EA~ 
i(6)-] 
and  let  T be  the Cartesian product  of  these  sets. By  construction,  T C X(T).  Further, T U P' c 
X(T) U X(P')  - X(T U P').  An argument virtually identical to that used in Step 3 establishes that P" 
is  the  maximal  set  A  satisfying  A C X(A);  however,  P" =  F',  and  F' C T U F',  so  there  is  a 
contradiction. 
PROOF OF PROPOSrTION  3.3:  Take any sets  BP  C S'0 and  Btm  C  S'  with BR C: Bi'  9  C(Bf)  Vi. 
Define  B'=  XfL I  Bj, j =p,  m. Claim: 
07Ti  OAP(BP  )  T,  ioAm(B  )m  C)7,  O  AP(BP  )] 
The  first inclusion is completely  trivial. As  for the second,  take any si E 7T,  o Am  (B ').  Then  there 
exists  M'  e=  Mtm, with  supp ,  ,i  c  B'i  such  that  s  e  F,m(jim,). That  is,  si  maximizes  fB"',g(s, 
s  ,)  dA  T, (s -).  But  since  sj  is  a  mixed  strategy, g  is  linear  in  s1.  Consequently,  si  maximizes 
g(s,  fB'I,S  d-  mi).  We  know  we  can  decompose  t1mi as  fl=1/1p,l  Vi  j  #  i,  define  sj'=  f  dlsf 
Clearly, tIj'  E C(Bjm). But  since  B!n C  (B"),  ii  E C(B1"). Consequently,  if  /J  is  regarded as  a 
probability measure over the set of kcj  pure strategy choices in Sp, then suppi  C Bf.  For each pure 
strategy component s; of si, si'E JF(g',t  )  and supp lP i  BP,,  sos  E  7T o A  (BP).  But then si E 
C[0Ti o A(BP)],  establishing  the  claim.  Since  SP C Si'" = C(S" ),  then  by  induction,  Vk >  0 
0 Ap(SP) g  7T,  o Am  (S')C  C[iT,  o Ak(SP  )  Since  SP  is  finite,  AP  converges  to  R"(G)  in  a 
finite  number  of  applications.  Consequently,  C [7T  0  Ak  (SP)]  converges  to  C [Rf(G)]  in  a  finite 
number of applications. Thus, 
R/m(G) =  l 
0  Ak (SP)  C C[Rf(G)I. 
k=O 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  4.1:  It is evident that the set of k-point rationalizable strategies is simply 
Ak(S).  Thus we wish to prove that 
lim  max  min d(s, s')  =  0. 
k-*oo seXk(S)  s'EEP 
Assume this is false. Choose s"  - X"(S)  such that Vn, 
mind(s",  s') >  E > 0. 
s' EP 
Let s*  be some limit point of s". X"(S)  are compact and nested, so s* E X"(S)  Vn. Thus, s* E P. 
Choosing s' = s* contradicts the supposition. 
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  5.2: 
Part (a):  Assume  that for some s* E N*(G),  an eigenvalue of  DF,s  lies outside  the unit circle. 
Sincef  is differentiable, there is a neighborhood of s* in which a first order approximation of f will do 
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with d(s*, s) <  q and  some  integer n  for which d(s*, fn(s))  >  e.  Consequently, we  may  choose  a 
sequence of strategy vectors st  converging to s* and a sequence of integers n, such that d(s*, fn,(st)) 
>  e. Let L(st, f(st))  be the line segment connecting st  and f(st),  and let 
n, 
Tt=  U  f'  [L(s,  , f(st))]- 
i=l 
Since f is continuous, T, is closed and connected. Let Q be the set of infinite sequences { s } for which 
st' E  Tt, and define 
T =  {s E S I  s is a limit point of some {S }  E  Q }. 
Claim 1: s* E T. Take the sequencef(st).f(st)  E Tt andf(st)  converges tof(s*)  = s*. 
Claim 2:  T 5f(T).  Take  some s' E T. There exists  {st},  S' E T,  with s,' converging  to s'.  By 
construction, there exists st" such that S,'  =  f(st),  where either s'7 E  L(st, f(st)),  or st'  E T,. Assume 
that there exists some  N  such that for all t >  N,  st'  E T,.  Choose  any  limit point s"  of  {st};  by 
definition, s" E T, and by continuity, s' = f(s").  Assume next that no such N exists. Then s* must be 
a limit point of st.  But then by continuity s' = f(s*)  = s*, and by Claim 1, s* E  T. 
Claim  3:  T  is  an  infinite  set.  Since  the  original  sequence  st  converges  to  s*,  and  since f  is 
continuous,  for  every  q <  e  we  can  find  N"  such  that  d(f(st), s*) <  'q for  all  t >  NT.  By  the 
connectedness of T,  for t >  NT there exists st  E T, such that d(s,, s) =  7. Let s' be a limit point of st. 
d(s', s*) =  q, s' E T. 
Claim 4:  T C P(G).  Take any set B with T C B.  T C  T U f(B  -  T) 5f(T)  U f(B  -  T) =f(B) 
5  X(B). Since T 5  S, we therefore have that T C Xk(S)  for all k > 0; the claim follows immediately 
from Proposition 3.1. 
Part (b):  If the N(G)  is not globally set stable, then we may choose some s0 and some e > 0 such 
that fl(so)  has a limit point s with B(s, e) n  N(G)  = 0.  Let L(s*, so) be the line segment connecting 
some  Nash  equilibrium  s*  with  s0.  Define  Tt'  = ft[L(s*,  so)],  and  let  Q'  and  T'  be  defined 
analogously to Part (a). Claims 1-4 may now be reproduced for the set T' (in fact, the proofs here are 
easier). 
Part (c):  Let s' and s" be two Nash  equilibria, define  Tt"  =ft[L(s',s")],  and let Q" and  T" be 
defined analogously to part (a). Claims 1-4  again follow. 
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION  5.4:  I present a proof of part (a) only. The proof of part (b) operates along 
very similar lines, and can, for the most part, be constructed by making the appropriate simplifica- 
tions in the proof given below. 
Assume  the  proposition  is  false;  that  is,  although  a  particular game  satisfies  the  specified 
properties, there is  nevertheless a  set  P  with  X(P) =  P  (since  I = 2,  this implies f(P)  =  P),  with 
N* =  {s*} c  P.  Since  s*  is  strictly  locally  stable,  we  can  choose  e  such  that  for  s E  B(s*,c), 
d(s*, f(s))  <  d(s*, s). Now  consider the set A =  P -  B(s*, e). Since P is closed and B(s*, e) is open, 
A is closed. By definition, f(P)  =  f(A)  + f(B(s*,  e)). By the preceeding analysis, this can be rewritten 
as P =f(A)  +  B', where B'  C B(s*,,E). Thus A Cf(A). 
As  the reader may verify, for any closed  set T C A,  T'-  f -'(T)  n A  is nonempty and closed. 
Further, if  T Cf(T),  and  T n f(A  -  T) = 0,  then (i)  T' C  T, (ii)  T' C f(T'),  (iii)  T' n f(A  -  T') 
=0. 
Part (i):  Take some s' E T'. There exists s E T such that s = f(s').  We know that s' X  A -  T, so 
s' E T. 
Part (ii):  Every s E T has a preimage in A, so T C f(T').  The desired conclusion follows from (i). 
Part (iii):  By (i),  T' n f(A  -  T) = 0;  we need only  show  T' n f(T  -  T') = 0.  Assume that for 
some s E T-  T', there exists s' E T' such that s' Ef(s).  Then s Ef-(s'),  s' E T, s e  A, sose  T', 
which is a contradiction. 
Define A1 =f  -  '(A)  n A, and recursively define Ak  =  f  (Ak-  1) n A. Since A is compact, A C A, 
A  C f(A),  and  A n f(A  -  A) = 0,  we  conclude  by  induction  that  this  is  a  nested  sequence  of 
compact,  nonempty  sets.  The  infinite  intersection, A*,  is  nonempty.  Now  we  claim  that  Vs(e 
A*,  f(s)  n A*  0.  Vk>0,  since  s EAk+l,  there  exists  sk  EAk  such  that  sk  Ef(s).  Since  the 
sequence {S k}  lies in a sequence of compact nested sets, its limit points lie in the infinite intersection: 
i.e., if s' is a limit point, s' E A *. Since g is continuous, s' E f(s). 
Now  choose  any s0 E A*.  By the above  result, we can  form a sequence  Sk  E f(Sk_-  )  such that 
sk  E A * Vk. But since A * 5  A,  Sk  X  B(s*, e) so Sk  does not converge to s*. This contradicts the fact 
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PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION  5.5:  Since under the specified conditionsf(-)  is a contraction mapping, 
Nash equilibrium is unique. We need only show P(G)  =  N*(G). 
Since  P(G)  is  the  intersection of  an  infinite  sequence  of  compact,  nested  sets, it  is  compact. 
Consequently, we can define 
di =  max  d(s,,  s,). 
s,,s, E-  P,(G) 
Assume without loss of generality that d, >  di Vi >  1. If point rationalizable strategies are not unique, 
then di >  0. Let s'  and sj' be the strategies for which d(s'1,  sj') =  dl.  There must exist t', t'  e  P(G) 
such that  fl(t') = sj,  and fl(t") = sj',  with g,(t')  =  v1(t")  (the first component  doesn't  effect  fl(  )). 
Now 
d(t', t") < (  d2 )  <  d1(I-1)1/2. 
(  i=2  J 
Further, d(f(t'),  f(t"))  >  d(s', sj')  =  dl.  So 
d(f(t),  ft"))>  d(t,  t"I(I 
1  ,/2 
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